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CRIMINALIZING SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND UNDERMINING
ROE V. WADE: THE TENSION BETWEEN ABORTION
DOCTRINE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
MYRISHA S. LEWIS*
This Article argues that prosecuting a woman carrying a fetus
that has not reached viability for prenatal substance abuse infringes
on that woman’s constitutional right to have an abortion. Although
other scholars have criticized prenatal substance abuse prosecutions
based on various constitutional and public policy arguments, the
tension between prenatal substance abuse prosecutions and the
Supreme Court’s abortion doctrine has not been adequately exam-
ined. I argue that prosecuting women for the crime of prenatal
substance abuse punishes women for not exercising their right to an
abortion and could even incentivize some women to obtain abortions
in order to avoid criminal prosecution. I also examine the science
underlying abortion doctrine, fetal health, and substance abuse which
reveals that (1) the right to abort the fetus is the most unfettered
when the possibility of harm to the fetus is also the greatest, which
is during the first trimester and (2) although the fetus is vulnerable
to harm from both illegal and legal substances, especially during the
first trimester, a causative link between prenatal substance abuse
and fetal or infant harm is often difficult to establish.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, an Alabama woman was arrested for
prenatal substance abuse under the state’s chemical endangerment
statute.1 This woman, referred to in federal court documents as
“Jane Doe,” was in her first trimester of pregnancy and sought an
abortion during her pre-trial detention.2 The county sheriff asserted
that Doe needed a court order in order to obtain an abortion while
in jail.3 As a result, Doe sued the sheriff in federal court for infring-
ing on her constitutional right to an abortion.4 Later, the district
attorney explained in a media interview that local officials opposed
her abortion request because they were “morally” opposed abortion
and because Doe’s action could be an attempt to evade responsibility
for the crime.5 If Jane Doe was able to obtain an abortion, then
there would be no prenatal substance abuse to prosecute.
1. Nina Martin, Alabama’s Meth Lab Law, Abortion Rights and the Strange Case
of Jane Doe, PROPUBLICA (July 31, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article
/alabamas-meth-lab-law-abortion-rights-and-the-strange-case-of-jane-doe [http://perma
.cc/4HVS8REJ].
2. Compl. at 2, Doe v. Singleton, No. 3:15-cv-01215 (N.D. Ala. July 20, 2015).
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Notice of Filing Suppl. Evid. at 1, Doe v. Singleton, No. 3:15-cv-01215-AKK (N.D.
Ala. July 29, 2015) (including a newspaper article that quoted the Lauderdale County
District Attorney who stated, “[N]ot only do we oppose [the abortion request] morally,
but based on the nature of the charge she is facing, which is chemical endangerment of
a child . . . . It is the policy of the state of Alabama to protect all life—born or unborn.”).
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This case invites a new approach to a question that legal schol-
ars have struggled with in recent years: should women who violate
laws prohibiting the use of illicit substances face additional criminal
charges because they are pregnant? Most states answer this ques-
tion in the negative by not prosecuting women for prenatal substance
abuse.6 However, Alabama, South Carolina, and, until recently, Ten-
nessee prosecute women for prenatal substance abuse using child
abuse, child endangerment, and assault statutes.7 Many scholars
6. Judy Peres, A Setback For Fetal Rights In Wisconsin Alcohol Case: Pregnant
Woman Who Drank Too Much Can’t Be Prosecuted, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 27, 1999),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-05-27/news/9905270079_1_deborah-zimmerman
-cornelia-whitner-appellate-court [http://perma.cc/8NDYE2ME]. At least 10 states have
prosecuted women for prenatal substance abuse, ultimately to have those convictions
overturned by the highest appellate court in the state. See State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d
50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); see also N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families v. A.L., 59 A.3d
576, 580–81 (2013); see also C. Antoinette Clarke, FINS, PINS, CHIPS, & CHINS: A
Reasoned Approach to the Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 634, 653–54 (1998) (discussing State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1992)); see also id. at 652–53 (discussing State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992)); see also Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s Criminal-
ization of Maternal Substance Abuse is not the Answer—A Comparative Legal Analysis,
15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389, 407–08 (2009) (discussing prosecutions for prenatal
substance abuse in Wyoming and Maryland); see also Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection
Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 781, 808
(2014) (discussing Rennie Gibbs’ prosecution and noting, “Gibbs’s prosecution, which began
in 2006, continued until early April 2014 when a judge dismissed the case. Mississippi
prosecutors threaten to retry the case. If convicted of depraved heart murder for birthing
a stillborn baby [after using cocaine during her pregnancy], Rennie Gibbs will face a
mandatory life sentence.”); see also Matthew Derringer, Note, If Addiction is a Mental
Disease, Let’s Start Treating It Like One: An Additional Recommendation for the Indiana
General Assembly’s Prenatal Substance Abuse Commission, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 141,
144 (2011) (discussing the 2005 case of Tayshea Aiwohi whose conviction for manslaughter
“partly due to her admission to smoking crystal methamphetamine for four days up to
and including the day she gave birth to [her child]” was overturned by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii which held that “a fetus is not within the statutory definition of ‘person’
for the purposes of a manslaughter charge in Hawai’i.”); see also Grace Lykins, Note,
Prohibition During Pregnancy: Supporting Mandatory Outpatient Rehabilitation for
Women Who Give Birth to Babies With Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 21 J. L. & POL’Y 155,
165–66 (2012) (explaining that “[i]n 2009, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that
an unborn child is not defined as a ‘child’ under state statutes pertaining to the crime of
endangerment of a child.” ); see also Peres, supra (stating that “[i]n a legal battle that
pitted the rights of pregnant women against those of their unborn children, a Wisconsin
appellate court ruled Wednesday that a woman who drank herself into a stupor in her
ninth month of pregnancy cannot be charged with attempted murder of her fetus.”).
7. See discussion of Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina statutes criminalizing
prenatal substance abuse infra Part I. See also COMMISSIONER BILL GIBBONS, TENNESSEE
DEP’T OF SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC., SUMMARY REPORT: SURVEY OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
GENERAL ON PUBLIC CHAPTER 820, 2 (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/docu
ments/1873320-survey-of-district-attorneys-general.html (reporting that, in Tennessee,
at least 28 women have been prosecuted for prenatal substance abuse under a new law en-
acted in April 2014); see also How We Identified Alabama Pregnancy Prosecutions, PRO-
PUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-identif ied
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have argued that women should not face additional charges for the
use of illegal substances during their pregnancies.8 In this Article,
I offer a different angle of critique: the conflict between a woman’s
constitutional right to have an abortion and prosecutions of women
for prenatal substance abuse. Based on Supreme Court precedent
in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, this Article differ-
entiates between prosecuting a prenatal substance abuser (1) when
she is pregnant but the fetus is not viable; (2) when she is pregnant
and the fetus is viable; and (3) after she gives birth to a child. While
scenarios (2) and (3) may be questioned as a matter of public policy,
under abortion doctrine, they are not constitutionally impermissi-
ble.9 But scenario (1), the prosecution of a woman for harm to a fetus
when she is constitutionally entitled to abort the fetus, should be held
to violate that woman’s constitutional right to have an abortion.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the different
approaches that Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina have
recently used to prosecute prenatal substance abuse. Alabama pros-
ecutes women for prenatal substance abuse regardless of whether
the fetus is viable; South Carolina prosecutes women for prenatal
substance abuse after the fetus is viable; and from 2014 to 2016,
Tennessee prosecuted women for prenatal substance abuse only
after a child was born.10 Part II focuses on relevant Supreme Court
-alabama-pregnancy-prosecutions [http://perma.cc/6H4SHSXE] (observing that, in Ala-
bama, at least 479 women have been prosecuted for prenatal substance abuse between
2006 and 2015); see also NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, South Carolina:
Leading the Nation in the Prosecution and Punishment of Pregnant Women (July 17,
2006), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/punishment_of_pregnant_women
/south_carolina_leading_the_nation_in_the_prosecution_punishment.php [http://perma
.cc/35H8R8S5] (noting that in South Carolina, between 1989 and 2006, at least 80 women
were arrested for prenatal substance abuse).
8. The legal literature on prenatal substance abuse prosecutions tends to fall within
three categories: equal protection claims, due process and privacy claims (without differ-
entiating between the timing of the prosecution), and cruel and unusual punishment
claims related to the criminalization of addiction. For an overview of the approaches to
analyzing prenatal substance abuse prosecutions, see, e.g., George Bundy Smith & Gloria
M. Dabiri, Prenatal Drug Exposure: The Constitutional Implications of Three Governmental
Approaches, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 53, 59 (1991). See also Doretta Massardo
McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and
Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 508 (1990). For a discussion of Equal Protection
claims, see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1450–55 (1991). For
a discussion of due process claims, privacy claims, and equal protection issues, see, e.g.,
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 856–58. For a discussion of Eighth Amendment issues, see,
e.g., Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use
During Pregnancy, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 241, 253–54 (2011).
9. See infra Part II.A (regarding the constitutional right to abortion before viability,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
10. See infra Part I.
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abortion precedent and explains why prosecutions for prenatal sub-
stance abuse before a fetus is viable are unconstitutional.11 Part II
also provides more information on the Article’s opening vignette,
which shows that prosecuting women for prenatal substance abuse
can be a part of governmental efforts to stymie a woman’s attempts
to obtain an abortion. Part III draws on medical and legal literature
to present the latest scientific information on fetal harm, fetal develop-
ment, addiction, pregnancy, and viability. The scientific literature
indicates that the fetus is most vulnerable to the harmful effects of
exposure to alcohol or illegal drugs such as physical, emotional, and
developmental problems during the first trimester, which is also
when a woman’s right to an abortion is the strongest.12 This litera-
ture also indicates that a predictable, causal link between prenatal
substance abuse and post-viability fetal harm is often missing.
I. CONTEMPORARY STATE PROSECUTIONS FOR
PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Tennessee, Alabama, and South Carolina have most recently
prosecuted women for prenatal substance abuse—unlike most states.13
Historically, states have not enacted laws that directly criminalize
a mother’s prenatal substance abuse.14 Instead, prosecutors have
historically applied criminal laws such as those addressing child
endangerment, child abuse, child neglect, drug distribution and de-
livery, and assaultive offenses including homicide.15 In the same
11. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–68 (1962) (holding a California stat-
ute unconstitutional for punishing one’s status as a drug user); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing first trimester substance abuse); see also infra
Part II (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
13. See Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-mothers
.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/RJ68JY2M] (discussing Alabama’s prosecution for prenatal
substance abuse while most states consider it a matter for child protective services); see
also Stephanie Chen, Pregnant and addicted, mothers in South Carolina find hope, CNN
(Oct. 27, 2009, 11:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/10/23/south.carolina.preg
nant.addicts/index.html?iref=nextin [http://perma.cc/5TM5ZSKQ] (stating that the South
Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the state’s decision to prosecute pregnant women
for prenatal substance abuse); see also Nina Liss-Schultz, Tennessee’s War on Women is
Sending New Mothers to Jail, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 14, 2016, 6:00 AM ), http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/tennessee-drug-use-pregnancy-fetal-assault-murder
-jail-prison-prosecution [http://perma.cc/A9AFCQH4].
14. Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 248.
15. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support,
25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 351–52 (2014); see Joanne E. Brosh & Monica K. Miller,
Regulating Pregnancy Behaviors: How the Constitutional Rights of Minority Women Are
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way, Alabama uses a “chemical endangerment” statute to prosecute
prenatal substance abuse, South Carolina uses the state’s child
abuse statute to prosecute prenatal substance abuse, and Tennessee
used an amendment to the state’s assault statute to prosecute pre-
natal substance abuse from 2014 to 2016.16
While the issue of the legal treatment of prenatal substance
abuse has drawn more media and academic attention recently due
to the large number of prosecutions, the issue is not new.17 Addition-
ally, contemporary prosecutions, with the exception of three cases
in Alabama and three in South Carolina, generally do not result in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions or any sort of state appellate record.18
Most of these cases are resolved through guilty pleas, which reduces
the availability of judicial records or insights into the factors that
influenced judges’ decisions to sentence women to often substantial
prison terms.19
From July 1, 2014, until July 1, 2016, when the statute expired,
Tennessee prosecuted women for prenatal substance abuse through an
amendment to the state’s criminal assault statute which encompassed
Disproportionately Compromised, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 441–42 (2008);
see also CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Parental Drug Abuse as Child Abuse,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. 2, 4–5 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs
/drug exposed.pdf (reviewing state statutes in order to identify and quote state statutes
addressing parental drug use as child abuse, including state statutes that specifically iden-
tify prenatal substance abuse as evidence of child abuse, child endangerment, or neglect
depending on the legal term used in the state).
16. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 15, at 2, 4, 26; see also
Ari Shapiro, Tenn. Law Targets Pregnant Women Who are Drug Addicts, NPR (Nov. 18,
2015, 5:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/18/456459420/tenn-law-targets-pregnant
-women-who-are-drug-addicts [http://perma.cc/48EBSN4J].
17. See infra Part II (discussing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000));
see also State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 55–56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); see also N.J. Dep’t
of Children & Families v. A.L., 59 A.3d 576, 587–88 (2013); see also Clarke, supra note
6, at 636; see also Fentiman, supra note 6, at 398–99; see also Goodwin, supra note 6, at
784–85; see also Derringer, supra note 6, at 147–48; see also Lykins, supra note 6, at
165–66; see also Peres, supra note 6.
18. See ex parte Hicks, 153 So.3d 53, 54 (Ala. 2014) (showing that the Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that the state’s chemical-endangerment statute applied to all chil-
dren, including fetuses); see also ex parte Ankrom, 152 So.3d 397, 404 (Ala. 2013) (holding
that the chemical-endangerment statute applied to unborn children); see also NAT’L AD-
VOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, Whitner v. South Carolina Fact Sheet, http://advocates
forpregnantwomen.org/issues/whitner.htm [http://perma.cc/3DVE7832] (indicating that
the South Carolina Supreme Court is willing to uphold convictions of pregnant women that
harm viable fetuses through prenatal substance abuse); see also Peres, supra note 6 (stat-
ing that the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on issues involving prenatal
substance abuse).
19. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (Ala. 2003) (stating that “[a]t the second
trial [adjudicating the legality of her cocaine ingestion during pregnancy] held May 14–16,
2001, the jury returned a guilty verdict. McKnight was sentenced to twenty years, sus-
pended to service of twelve years.” ); see infra Parts I.A–I.C.
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harm to a newborn child who was prenatally exposed to narcotics.20
In Tennessee, the statute addressing prenatal substance abuse was
limited to illegal narcotic usage whereas Alabama’s chemical endan-
germent statute applies, as established through case law, to prena-
tal substance abuse of all illicit substances.21 In the same way,
South Carolina uses its child abuse and endangerment statute to
prosecute the use of illegal substances after the fetus is viable.22
A. Alabama
Alabama prosecutes women for prenatal substance abuse re-
gardless of whether a fetus is viable.23 Alabama was recently labeled
as the “national capital for prosecuting women on behalf of their
newborn children.” 24 This description stemmed from the number of
women that Alabama has prosecuted for prenatal substance abuse
between 2006 and late July of 2015: at least 479.25 Of those prosecu-
tions, 24% of cases involved marijuana, 22% involved cocaine, 18%
of cases methamphetamine, 14% opiates, 8% amphetamine, 6% ben-
zodiazepine, 3% methadone, and 5% “all other” drugs.26 The prosecu-
tion is so zealous that, in one instance, the district attorney had to
drop a prosecution for prenatal substance abuse after it was con-
firmed that the defendant was not even pregnant.27
Alabama prosecutes women for prenatal substance abuse using
its “chemical-endangerment statute.” 28 The original intent of the
20. Joel Ebert, Tennessee law that punishes mothers of drug-dependent babies to end,
THE TENNESSEAN (Mar. 23, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news
/politics/2016/03/22/tennessee-law-punishes-mothers-drug-dependent-babies-end
/82141832 [http://perma.cc/PQ58NGQE]; Tony Gonzalez, Tennessee will criminalize moms
who use drugs while pregnant, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 30, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www
.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/29/tn-will-criminalize-moms-using-drugs
-pregnant/8473333 [http://perma.cc/2D2SQA4L].
21. See infra Parts I.A, I.B.
22. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (“This case concerns the
scope of the child abuse and endangerment statute in the South Carolina Children’s Code
(the Code), S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 (1985). We hold the word ‘child’ as used in that
statute includes viable fetuses.”).
23. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 788.
24. Calhoun, supra note 13.
25. See also How We Identified Alabama Pregnancy Prosecutions, supra note 7.
26. Id.
27. Nina Martin & Amy Yurkanin, Special Report: Alabama Leads the Nation in
Turning Pregnant Women into Felons, AL.COM (Sept. 23, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.al
.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/when_the_womb_is_a_crime_scene.html [http://perma.cc
/7JCANQDU].
28. See ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). The statute’s title
is “Chemical endangerment of exposing a child to an environment in which controlled
substances are produced or distributed;” however, the Alabama Supreme Court refers
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2006 statute, according to many commentators and lawyers, was to
protect children from harmful environments such as methamphet-
amine labs.29 The statute reads, in relevant part,
(a) A responsible person commits the crime of chemical endan-
germent of exposing a child to an environment in which he
or she does any of the following:
(1) Knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a
child to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact
with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug
paraphernalia as defined in Section 13A-12-260. A violation
under this subdivision is a Class C felony.
(2) Violates subdivision (1) and a child suffers serious physical
injury by exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact
with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug
paraphernalia. A violation under this subdivision is a Class
B felony.
(3) Violates subdivision (1) and the exposure, ingestion, inhala-
tion, or contact results in the death of the child. A violation
under this subdivision is a Class A felony.30
While the chemical endangerment statute does not mention
pregnant women, fetuses, or wombs, it is used to prosecute prenatal
substance abuse.31 In Alabama, women are charged with crimes of
varying felony classifications based on the extent to which the fetus
was harmed (e.g., Class A, Class B, Class C); however, harm ranges
from any exposure (as would be evidenced by a positive drug test
and a Class C Felony) to death as a result of prenatal substance
abuse (Class A).32
to it as the “chemical endangerment statute.” See Ex Parte Ankrom, 152 So.3d 397, 401
(Ala. 2013).
29. Calhoun, supra note 13. While some refer to the “intent” of the statute, the state
of Alabama does not have legislative history material available in the same way as the
United States Congress, for example. See also Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Tape
#561, CR-09-1148, June 21, 2011, Recording of Oral Argument in Ex parte Ankrom.
30. ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.); see, e.g., Martin, supra
note 1 (stating that “[t]he statute took effect at the height of the methamphetamine panic
of the mid-2000s. The intent was to protect children living in homes that had become
dangerous drug factories, state Rep. Patricia Todd, a Democrat from Birmingham, noted
in an amicus brief in 2012.”).
31. See infra Part II.B (discussing Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 403 (Ala. 2013)).
32. See ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.); see also infra
Part II.B (discussing prosecution of Amanda Kimbrough whose child died shortly after
birth) (explaining that, while Kimbrough was originally charged with a Class B Felony,
an autopsy after the death of her child showed that his death resulted from acute
methamphetamine intoxication, and Kimbrough pled guilty to Class A Chemical En-
dangerment).
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Although prenatal substance abuse prosecutions using the
chemical endangerment statute have been occurring since 2006, it
was not until 2013 that the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed that
the chemical endangerment statute applied to “unborn children.” 33
There are only three identified cases in which pregnant women
charged with chemical endangerment of a child for prenatal sub-
stance abuse have gone to trial; the remaining chemical endanger-
ment cases have been resolved through guilty pleas or dismissals.34
In May of 2016, the Alabama General Assembly amended the
chemical endangerment statute to include an affirmative defense to
prosecution.35 The chemical endangerment statute now has an
additional provision:
(c) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section
that the controlled substance was provided by lawful pre-
scription for the child, and that it was administered to the
child in accordance with the prescription instructions pro-
vided with the controlled substance.36
Thus, women were prosecuted under the statute for approximately
ten years, without access to an affirmative defense.
B. Tennessee
From July 1, 2014 until July 1, 2016, Tennessee also prosecuted
women for prenatal substance abuse as assault although the prose-
cutions in Tennessee only targeted women who used narcotics while
33. See infra Part II.B (discussing Ex Parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 403 (Ala. 2013)).
34. See Nina Martin, Take a Valium, Lose Your Kid, Go to Jail, PROPUBLICA/AL
.COM (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.propublica.org/article/when-the-womb-is-a-crime-scene
[http://perma.cc/XE7ABB6F]; see also Nina Martin, This Law is Supposed to Protect
Babies: But It’s Putting Their Moms Behind Bars, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 23, 2015, 6:00
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/09/alabama-chemical-endangerment
-drug-war [http://perma.cc/T76PTTL5]. The three identif ied defendants’ cases were also
appealed multiple times and ultimately resolved by the Alabama Supreme Court. See Ex
parte Hicks, 153 So.3d 53 (Ala. 2014); see also Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 404 (ad-
dressing Amanda Kimbrough and Hope Ankrom). The word “identif ied” is used because,
in Alabama, chemical endangerment cases are sealed under Rule 52 as they involve “a
victim of child abuse.” See Ala. R. App. Proc., Rule 52. A state brief in a fourth case, State
v. Ward, was used in Ex parte Ankrom as an Exhibit by the State of Alabama; however,
the whole history of the case is not available on Westlaw.
35. See Nina Martin, Alabama Lawmakers Limit Drug Prosecutions in Pregnancy,
PROPUBLICA (May 4, 2016, 1:02 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/alabama-law
makers-limit-drug-prosecutions-in-pregnancy [http://perma.cc/BB262RDF]; see also ALA.
CODE § 26-15-3.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
36. See ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
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pregnant.37 The two-year duration of the state’s prosecutions of
women for prenatal substance abuse as assault existed because the
law used for these prosecutions was enacted in 2014 and had a
sunset provision of July 1, 2016.38 Because of its targeted approach
to the public health issue underlying prenatal substance abuse
prosecutions, neonatal abstinence syndrome, Tennessee has been
labeled as a “forward-leaning state.” 39 Neonatal abstinence syn-
drome can adversely impact babies born to drug-addicted mothers.40
The Tennessee Department of Health observed “a nearly ten-fold
rise in the incidence of babies born with [neonatal abstinence syn-
drome] in Tennessee” from 2004 to 2014.41
In 2014, Tennessee enacted legislation, commonly referred to
as “Public Chapter 820,” to make it clear that the state’s law on
assault applied to prenatal substance abuse.42 According to the
Governor of Tennessee, “[t]he intent of [the legislation] was to give
law enforcement and district attorneys a tool to address illicit drug
use among pregnant women through treatment programs.”43 Specifi-
cally, the 2014 legislation added provisions (c)(2) and (c)(3) to the
section of Tennessee law explaining who can be a victim under
Tennessee criminal law.44 The new legislation stated:
(c)(1) Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any lawful act or
lawful omission by a pregnant woman with respect to an embryo
or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any lawful medical or
surgical procedure to which a pregnant woman consents, per-
formed by a health care professional who is licensed to perform
such procedure.
37. See Ebert, supra note 20; see also Gonzalez, supra note 20.
38. Ebert, supra note 20; Gonzalez, supra note 20.
39. Tony Gonzalez & Shelley DuBois, Tennessee Faces Epidemic of Drug-Dependent
Babies, THE TENNESSEAN (June 13, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/investi
gations/2014/06/13/drug-dependent-babies-challenge-doctors-politicians/10112813
[http://perma.cc/E6KXJU7N] (“ ‘When you talk about forward-leaning states that are look-
ing at NAS, you always hear Tennessee, Tennessee, Tennessee,’ Botticelli said.” Michael
Botticelli is the Director of the National Drug Control Policy at the White House.).
40. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://tn.gov/health
/topic/nas#sthash.JwTKk9AW.dpuf [http://perma.cc/X2GXVM8Z].
41. Id.
42. S. 1391, Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014), http://www.tn.gov/sos/acts/108/pub/pc0820
.pdf; see, e.g., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS): Frequently Asked Questions, TENN.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/NAS_FAQ.pdf.
43. Gonzalez, supra note 20.
44. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.), with
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). See also accompany-
ing notes from the Tennessee Sentencing Commission on Annotated West Version of
§ 39-13-107 (“This section represents a major change in Tennessee law. See [Tenn. Code
Ann.] § 39-13-214.”).
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(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), nothing in this section shall
preclude prosecution of a woman for assault under § 39-13-101
for the illegal use of a narcotic drug, as defined in § 39-17-402,
while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the
narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her illegal
use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by
subdivision (c)(2) that the woman actively enrolled in an addic-
tion recovery program before the child is born, remained in the
program after delivery, and successfully completed the program,
regardless of whether the child was born addicted to or harmed
by the narcotic drug.45
Public Chapter 820 is newer than the Alabama chemical endanger-
ment statute.46 It was facially apparent that the Tennessee statute
applied to pregnant women who were illegally using narcotics whereas
the Alabama “chemical endangerment” statute does not clearly ap-
ply to prenatal substance abuse, an issue that defense attorneys
have raised unsuccessfully before the Alabama Supreme Court.47
Additionally, the Tennessee statute contained an affirmative defense
when the statute was enacted as opposed to the Alabama statute,
which was not amended until ten years after its initial enactment
to include an affirmative defense.48
In Tennessee, the plain language of the statute indicated that “ad-
diction” or “harm” was required, although the word “harm” was not de-
fined.49 Additionally, prosecutions in Tennessee for prenatal substance
abuse could only occur after the birth of a child: if no child was born,
then the statute could not apply, unlike in Alabama where the
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107.
46. Compare S. 1391, Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014), http://www.tn.gov/sos/acts/108/pub
/pc0820.pdf (stating that the bill passed April 9, 2014), with ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2
(Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (indicating that the law was enacted in 2006).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (indicating
that pregnant women can be prosecuted for illegal drug use if the child becomes addicted
to or harmed by the drug use). See Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 411 (Ala. 2013)
(holding that the chemical endangerment statute applied to fetuses even though the
statute didn’t expressly say so); see also Tony Gonzalez, Remedies Differ on Dealing with
Addicted Babies, THE TENNESEEAN (Mar. 11, 2013), 2013 WLNR 6286732 (“During the
debate, some lawmakers questioned why Yager’s bill targets only prescription drugs. He
responded that he wanted to begin by targeting a small population. A law that is too
broad, he said, could make so many pregnant mothers eligible that preventive treatment
costs would sink the effort altogether. ‘We’ve got to give people an incentive to get
cleaned up,’ Yager said later. ‘The pain pill epidemic in this state is so widespread, there’s
no one simple solution to it.’ ” ).
48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis Sess.) (creating an
affirmative defense against prosecution); see Martin, supra note 35 (stating that if passed,
the bill would create a defense 10 years after the law’s initial passage).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107.
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chemical endangerment statute applied to all pregnant women with
no regard for their constitutional rights before a fetus was viable.50
In addition to only applying to children ex utero, Tennessee’s
approach to addressing prenatal substance abuse with criminaliza-
tion was accompanied by an examination of the efficacy of such an
approach. Unlike other states, when signing the bill into law, Tennes-
see’s governor specifically expressed a desire for more information
on the effectiveness of the law as it related to substance abuse
treatment for pregnant women.51 This effectiveness inquiry corre-
sponded with a two year “sunset provision.” 52 In January 2015, the
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security sent a
survey related to Public Chapter 820 to all thirty-one of the attor-
neys general in the state.53 Twenty-seven of the thirty-one state
attorneys general responded to the survey.54 When asked “Do you
think Public Chapter 820 is helpful in preventing more babies from
being born with drug dependency issues (Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome)?”, seventeen of the twenty-seven responding attorneys
general replied “Yes,” seven replied “No,” and three did not respond
to the question.55 The results of the survey revealed that only ten of
the thirty-one Tennessee judicial districts used the law in the sur-
vey period of April 24, 2014 to December 31, 2014 to prosecute
prenatal substance abusers.56 This resulted in a total of between
twenty-eight and thirty cases which were initiated for prosecution
as of December 31, 2014.57 Comparatively, even if Tennessee had
continued to prosecute women at this rate for ten years, fewer women
would have been prosecuted under the Tennessee statute than the
Alabama chemical endangerment statute.58
C. South Carolina
South Carolina specifically targets prenatal substance abuse
affecting viable fetuses through its child abuse and endangerment
50. Compare Liss-Shultz, supra note 13, with Goodwin, supra note 6, at 788.
51. See Gibbons, supra note 7, at 2 (cited to and discussed by Tony Gonzalez, Pros-
ecutor Surveys Critique Pregnancy Criminalization, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 19, 2015,
1:06 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2015/04/19/prosecutor-surveys
-critique-pregnancy-criminalization/26013395 [http://perma.cc/G8KESYNW]).
52. Gonzalez, supra note 20; accord S. 1391 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014), http://www
.tn.gov/sos/acts/108/pub/pc0820.pdf.
53. See Gibbons, supra note 7, at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. (The response states, “Twenty-eight cases had been initiated for prosecutions
as of December 31, 2014 (plus two additional 2015 cases).” )
58. See Martin & Yurkanin, supra note 27 (citing 479 prosecutions in Alabama from
2005–2015).
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statute.59 Between 1989 and 2006, at least eighty women were
arrested for prenatal substance abuse in South Carolina.60 Media
coverage documenting interviews with prosecutors and health care
providers indicates that, while South Carolina still prosecutes
women for prenatal substance abuse, the prevalence of those prose-
cutions has decreased significantly from the 1990s.61 A Charleston
County Hospital’s scheme for identifying prenatal substance abus-
ers and then providing this evidence to law enforcement was re-
jected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston;
this case combined with a number of state criminal cases gives South
Carolina the most comprehensive legal history of the states ana-
lyzed in this Article.62 A number of the prosecutions of women for
prenatal substance abuse that are commonly analyzed in the legal
literature, namely those at issue in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
Whitner v. South Carolina, and State v. McKnight, occurred in
South Carolina.63
Unlike the aforementioned statutes used by Tennessee and
Alabama to prosecute prenatal substance abuse, the statute used by
South Carolina does not mention narcotics or controlled substances:
(A) It is unlawful for a person who has charge or custody of a
child, or who is the parent or guardian of a child, or who is
responsible for the welfare of a child as defined in Section
63-7-20 to:
(1) place the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the
child’s life, physical or mental health, or safety;
(2) do or cause to be done unlawfully or maliciously any bodily
harm to the child so that the life or health of the child is
endangered or likely to be endangered; or
(3) willfully abandon the child.
59. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (“This case concerns the
scope of the child abuse and endangerment statute in the South Carolina Children’s Code
(the Code), S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 (1985). We hold the word ‘child’ as used in that
statute includes viable fetuses.” (citation omitted)).
60. See NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, supra note 7.
61. See Chen, supra note 13 (explaining that since 1989 other states are less likely
to bring charges and most courts are eager to dismiss the cases); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Substance Exposed Infants: State Responses to the Problem,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. 1, 34 (2009), https://www.ncsacw
.samhsa.gov/f iles/Substance-Exposed-Infants.pdf (stating that South Carolina has sen-
tenced ten women under the infant exposure laws and none of those were recent).
62. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76–78 (2001).
63. See, e.g., Katherine Sikich, Peeling Back the Layers of Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 369, 390 (2005) (referring to Whitner v. State,
492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), and Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)).
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(B) A person who violates subsection (A) is guilty of a felony
and for each offense, upon conviction, must be fined in the
discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.64
Similar to the resolutions of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions
in Alabama and Tennessee, most of the cases in South Carolina are
resolved through pleas.65
II. APPLYING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT TO PRENATAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROSECUTIONS: ROE V. WADE, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD V. CASEY, AND VIABILITY
This Article argues that the timing of prenatal substance abuse
prosecutions as it relates to the viability or non-viability of a fetus
is critical to determining whether a prenatal substance abuse prose-
cution is constitutional. Prenatal substance abuse prosecutions are
often categorized as “attacks on reproductive liberty” regardless of
the gestational age of the fetus when the illegal substance was in-
gested.66 Laws criminalizing prenatal substance abuse are classified
as “fetal protection laws,” which are laws that are part of a larger
effort to establish fetuses as “legal” persons and to overturn Roe v.
Wade.67 This Article adds to the scholarship on fetal protection laws
by focusing on three case studies and the tension between abortion
law and the application of fetal protection laws.
A. The Viability Framework and Prenatal Substance Abuse
Prosecutions
The constitutional right to an abortion exists before a fetus is
viable, therefore, prosecutions of women for prenatal substance abuse
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.)
65. A Westlaw search for prosecutions of pregnant women under South Carolina
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70 (2015), reveals one case other than Whitner v. State,
492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) which was a family court case and not a criminal case. News
accounts indicate that prenatal substance abusers continue to plead guilty. See, e.g.,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Crack-Using Woman Admits Guilt in the Death of Her Fetus, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/03/us/crack-using-woman-admits
-guilt-in-the-death-of-her-fetus.html [http://perma.cc/JE8YZEDT]; Chen, supra note 13
(“Others made a plea bargain with the courts, allowing them one last chance at treat-
ment to avoid prison.”).
66. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 784–85, 788, 856 (citing to Dorothy Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991), Anita Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private
Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987), and Michelle Oberman,
Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal
Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1999–2000)).
67. See id. at 787.
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before the fetus is viable violate that constitutional right. In 1973, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that women have a constitu-
tional right to abortion.68 In Roe, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that
the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but . . .
this right is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation.” 69 The Court recognized:
[A]n important and legitimate [state] interest in preserving and
protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . and . . . another
important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality
of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each [of
these state interests] grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches term and . . . becomes “compelling” [when the fetus
is viable].70
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that a fetus is “viable” when
it is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with
artificial aid.” 71 The Court then discussed viability which, at that
time, was “usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but
[could] occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.” 72 Later, the Court summa-
rized its decision by explaining that the abortion right existed within
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by as-
serting the well-known trimester framework:
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69. Id. at 154.
70. Id. at 162–63.
71. Id. at 160.
72. Id. In 1992, the Court noted that the point at which viability occurred had
changed but that this did not affect the central holding of Roe. See Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“We have seen how time has
overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for
abortions safe to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, see Akron I,
supra, 462 U.S., at 429, n. 11 . . . and advances in neonatal care have advanced viability
to a point somewhat earlier. Compare Roe, 410 U.S., at 160 . . . with Webster, supra, 492
U.S., at 515–16 . . . (opinion of REHNQUIST, C.J.); see Akron I, 462 U.S. at 457, and n.
5 . . . (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). But these facts go only to the scheme of time limits
on the realization of competing interests, and the divergences from the factual premises
of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the
earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to
justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. The soundness or unsoundness of
that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at approxi-
mately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does
today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory
capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future. Whenever it may occur, the attainment
of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was
decided; which is to say that no change in Roe’s factual underpinning has left its central
holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for overruling it.” ).
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(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s at-
tending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of
the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion proce-
dure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promot-
ing its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.73
The trimester framework of Roe was also ultimately rejected by the
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, after much debate and liti-
gation related to the right to abortion.74 In spite of the abandonment
of the trimester framework, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
central holding of Roe: “The woman’s right to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade.
It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”75
Therefore, following that rule of law, a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy before viability means that she should not be pun-
ished for not exercising that right and terminating her pregnancy
before viability. Prosecuting prenatal substance abusers for abuse
that occurs before the fetus is viable undermines the Supreme Court’s
abortion precedent. To prosecute women for prenatal substance abuse
before the fetus is viable, which is when their right to terminate the
pregnancy is the most unfettered, punishes these women for not
exercising their right to an abortion.
Even though the state’s interest in “potential life,” which is the
fetus that ultimately becomes a child, can be severely damaged pre-
viability, especially during the first trimester, the state’s interest in
potential life does not become “compelling” until the point of viabil-
ity. Thus, while prenatal substance abuse before the fetus is viable,
especially during the first trimester, potentially has the greatest
adverse impacts on an infant, as indicated infra in Part III, the
state’s compelling interest in potential life is not an interest that
allows the state to regulate women in order to produce the health or
quality of life that the state desires for future potential life. “Under
73. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
74. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 873 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 871.
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Roe [and Casey], non-viable fetuses have no rights superior to the
women who carry them.” 76 Thus, while prenatal substance abuse
may adversely impact the health of a future viable fetus or infant,
the state cannot specifically subject pregnant women to criminal
penalties due to their status as pregnant women in order to present
a desired outcome. To do so would render a fetus’s rights superior
to those of the women who carry them. Instead, applying the viabil-
ity framework to prenatal substance abuse, the State can only legis-
late (and prosecute) to protect fetal rights during the time period in
which its interests become “compelling:” post-viability. Doing so en-
sures the status quo in which fetal rights remain “inferior” to the
rights of the women who carry them even though the exercise of
those rights could affect the fetus’s quality of life after viability.
The state of Alabama has argued that women do not have a
“right” to use illicit substances while pregnant which is accurate.77
But, while abortion precedent does not provide women with the right
to undertake any actions that they desire during pregnancy, regard-
less of the fetus’s viability, women should not become defendants by
virtue of their actions while pregnant with a non-viable fetus. Other-
wise, “[i]f the state is permitted to detain and confine pregnant
women for the benefit of fetal health, women are reduced to nothing
more than fetal containers whose rights and liberties are dependent
upon their acquiescence to mothering rules dictated by the state.”78
Prosecuting women for their actions while pregnant with a non-
viable fetus also has the effect of incentivizing abortions before the
fetus is viable, which was a criticism levied at Tennessee’s fetal as-
sault bill before it expired in 2016.79
76. Lorraine Schmall, Addicted Pregnancy As A Sex Crime, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263,
270 (1993).
77. State Response to Ankrom’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in the Circuit Court
of Coffee County, Alabama, Enterprise Division. State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss Indictment, Alabama v. Ankrom, No. CC-09-395 (Oct. 9, 2009). Exhibit A to the
State’s Response was the State’s Brief in another case involving the prosecution of a woman
for prenatal substance abuse, State v. Ward. Id. at 3. (“The State of Alabama adopts all
of the arguments made in the briefs attached to the instant brief, without reservation.”).
Id. at Exhibit A, p. 36–37, Answer and Br. of Resp’t State of Alabama, Ward v. Alabama
(Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (“She is being prosecuted for exposing her child to a controlled
substance. The statute applies to any ‘responsible person,’ male or female . . . . The statute
does not single out a child’s mother for prosecution while exempting other responsible
persons who do the same . . . . Ward enjoyed the same right to use cocaine during her
pregnancy that she enjoyed before her pregnancy and that she enjoys now: absolutely
none. Thus . . . the statute does not impose any limitation on any privacy right that she
or anyone else in this state, pregnant or not, possesses.” ).
78. April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women
for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 196 (2007).
79. Ebert, supra note 20 (“Rep. Mike Stewart said he worried the unintended con-
sequences of the law have resulted in people being discouraged from seeking drug
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B. The State of Alabama and Viability
While constitutional jurisprudence focuses on the viability of
fetuses, the Alabama Supreme Court ignores the viability frame-
work in the context of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions. In
2013, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the term “child” in the
text of the child endangerment statute applied to unborn children,
without any distinction between viable and non-viable fetuses.80 The
Alabama Supreme Court cited the reasoning expressed by the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Ankrom, the preced-
ing appellate case, and explained that “the plain meaning of the
word ‘child’ is broad enough to encompass all children—born and
unborn—including Ankrom’s and Kimbrough’s unborn children in
the cases before us.” 81 When deciding the “plain meaning” of the
word “child,” the Alabama Supreme Court looked at past cases where
it had distinguished between a viable and non-viable fetus and the
South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Whitner.82
When ruling that the word “child” included viable and non-viable
fetuses, the Alabama Supreme Court categorized past reliance upon
Roe v. Wade outside of the abortion context as “misplaced.” 83 In
other words, the Alabama Supreme Court’s position on Roe v. Wade
changed from one of deference to Roe before September 9, 2011, the
date on which Mack v. Carmack was decided, to a position that
avoided applying Roe whenever possible. Instead of differentiating
between pre-viability and post-viability fetuses, the Alabama Su-
preme Court now uses the language of the Brody Act, which “defines
the term ‘person’ as ‘a human being, including an unborn child in
utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability.’ ” 84
treatment. He said the law has even caused some women to seek an abortion.”); PBS
NEWSHOUR, Tennessee Discontinues Controversial Fetal Assault Law, PBS (Mar. 27, 2016,
12:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/tennessee-discontinues-controversial-fetal
-assault-law [http://perma.cc/R4GUTETG] (“Doctors testified that the threat of arrest kept
many addicted pregnant women from seeking treatment and medical care. Other critics
say addicts were choosing abortion over being found out and prosecuted.”).
80. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 419 (Ala. 2013).
81. Id. at 411.
82. Id. at 419 (“Thus, although Whitner is persuasive on the issue whether an unborn
child is a person and thus a ‘child,’ we find Whitner’s adoption of the viability distinction
to be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word ‘child’ and with the laws of this State.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Court of Criminal Appeals limited the applicability
of the chemical-endangerment statute to viable unborn children in Ankrom, this Court
expressly rejects that distinction as inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word
‘child’ and with the laws of this State. Because we reject the Court of Criminal Appeals’
application of a viability distinction, the petitioners’ arguments on the issue are moot.”).
83. Id.
84. Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597, 600 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis omitted).
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According to the Alabama Supreme Court, in the past, “parents
could not bring a wrongful-death action for the death of an unborn
child before viability . . . at least in part, because of a misplaced
deference to Roe v. Wade,” but after the Mack decision, the Alabama
Supreme Court overruled that position and allowed for the “recovery
of damages for the wrongful death of any unborn child, regardless
of viability.” 85 Yet many states, including those that do not prose-
cute women for prenatal substance abuse, have statutes that recog-
nize harm to a non-viable fetus in the criminal or civil context.86 In
spite of this, according to the Alabama Supreme Court, “outside the
right to abortion created in Roe and upheld in Planned Parenthood,
the viability distinction has no place in the laws of this State.” 87
However, a deference to Roe v. Wade is not misplaced, and the via-
bility distinction has a place in any state law that prosecutes a
mother when the exercise of her constitutional right to an abortion
could preclude prosecution. There is no conflict between allowing
civil recovery for damage to a non-viable fetus or the recognition of
a fetus as a victim in a homicide statute and abortion precedent
because abortion precedent is about a woman’s right to abort a fetus
not another individual’s right to terminate a fetus.
Amanda Kimbrough, one of the defendants whose criminal case
was adjudicated in Ex parte Ankrom,88 could have avoided her pros-
ecution for prenatal substance abuse if she had exercised her right
to an abortion. During a prenatal visit, Kimbrough was informed
that her son would likely have Down Syndrome and that she could
abort the fetus.89 However, Kimbrough declined to have an abortion
because she and her husband “oppose abortion on moral grounds.”90
On April 29, 2008, Amanda Kimbrough’s son was born prematurely,
at twenty-five weeks, weighting two pounds one ounce.91 Kimbrough’s
child died nineteen minutes after birth.92 An autopsy revealed that
“Timmy had died from ‘acute methamphetamine intoxication’ ” and
Amanda Kimbrough was indicted for causing the exposure of Timmy
Kimbrough to methamphetamine which, according to the indictment,
resulted in his death.93 On December 9, 2009, Amanda Kimbrough
85. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So.3d at 419.
86. See, e.g., Margaret Kelly, Note, Increasing Victimization Through Fetal Abuse
Redefinition, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 685, 690–91 (2014).
87. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So.3d at 419.
88. Id. at 400.
89. Calhoun, supra note 13.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ala. Ct. of Crim. Appeals, Unpublished Mem. at 4, CR-09-0485 (Sep. 23, 2011);
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pled guilty to Class A Chemical Endangerment of a Child, a Felony
permitting “[not] less than 10 . . . years and not more than life or
ninety-nine . . . years imprisonment in the state penitentiary, and
[possibly] a fine not to exceed $20,000.” 94
The other defendant in Ex parte Ankrom, Hope E. Ankrom, had
a “documented” substance abuse problem.95 During her pregnancy,
Ms. Ankrom tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine on more
than one occasion.96 Ankrom was admitted to the hospital in labor
at thirty-four weeks on January 31, 2009.97 At birth, both Ms. Ankrom
and her son tested positive for cocaine.98 She was charged with a
Class C Felony for chemical endangerment of a child.99 Because both
of the defendants in Ex parte Ankrom, Amanda Kimbrough and
Hope Ankrom, used illegal drugs in their third trimester of preg-
nancy when the fetus would be viable, their prosecutions for prenatal
substance abuse would not be unconstitutional under this Article’s
application of abortion doctrine.
C. Jane Doe v. Rick Singleton: The Conflict Between First
Trimester Prenatal Substance Abuse Prosecutions and
Supreme Court Abortion Precedent
As noted in the Introduction, the federal court filings of a woman
charged under the chemical endangerment statute reveal not only
that prosecutions for prenatal substance abuse can occur before a
fetus is viable but also that law enforcement may use arrest and
pre-trial detention to deliberately sabotage a woman’s attempts to
Indictment of Amanda Helaine Borden Kimbrough, State v. Kimbrough, No. CC-08-381
(2008).
94. See Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty, State v. Kimbrough, No. CC-08-381
(2009); see also Plea Agreement, State v. Kimbrough, No. CC-08-381 (issues reserved for
appeal are handwritten on the last page of the Plea Agreement under the necessary sig-
natures); see also Ala. Court of Crim. Appeals Unpublished Mem., CR-09-0485, at 3 (2011).
95. State Response to Ankrom’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in the Circuit
Court of Coffee County, Alabama, Enterprise Division; State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss Indictment, Alabama v. Ankrom, No. CC-09-395 (Oct. 9, 2009). The State’s
motion did not indicate when during her pregnancy Ms. Ankrom tested positive for mari-
juana and cocaine. See Medical Center Enterprise, Enterprise, Alabama, History and
Physical, State v. Ankrom, CR-09-1148.
96. See Medical Center Enterprise, Enterprise, Alabama, History and Physical, supra
note 95.
97. See id. Another document within the docket, the “Operative Report,” stated that
Ankrom presented with a “39-week gestation in labor with breech presentation” and that
a “viable, newborn male, 4 pounds 12 ounces” resulted from the cesarean section.” Id.
98. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment at 1, State v. Ankrom, No. CC-09-395 (2009).
99. See Warrant Number WR 2009 000163.00, State v. Ankrom, CR-09-1148 (Feb. 24,
2009).
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obtain an abortion before the fetus is viable. In July 2015, Jane Doe
was arrested and charged under Alabama’s chemical endangerment
statute.100 Jane Doe was pregnant at the time of her arrest and sued
the Sheriff of Lauderdale County, Alabama in federal court in order
to obtain an abortion while in jail.101 Jane Doe noted in her initial
complaint that she was in “her first trimester of pregnancy” and that
the Defendant, the Sheriff of Lauderdale County, had denied her re-
quest for “medical furlough or supervised transport to obtain an
abortion, directing her instead to seek a court order.”102 The plaintiff
also pleaded that she had tried to obtain an abortion before she was
confined.103 The complaint also noted that the Lauderdale County
district attorney “has stated that he opposes Plaintiff’s request for
an abortion.”104
Supplemental evidence filed by Jane Doe revealed that Alabama
government officials use the chemical endangerment statute to under-
mine the exercise of the constitutional right to abortion. On July 29,
2015, Jane Doe filed supplemental evidence, including a newspaper
article in which the District Attorney stated “ ‘[n]ot only do we oppose
this [abortion request] morally, but based on the nature of the charge
she is facing, which is chemical endangerment of a child’ . . . . ‘It is the
policy of the state of Alabama to protect all life—born or unborn.’”105
The news story also revealed that the District Attorney “filed a
motion in state court to terminate the parental rights . . . of Jane
Doe with regard to the fetus and [the District Attorney confirmed]
that a guardian ad litem ha[d] been appointed to represent the fetus
in that proceeding.”106 The District Attorney’s reason for appointing
a guardian ad litem for the fetus was very similar to that espoused
by individuals who agree with fetal personhood movements: “Our
position, if the termination for parental rights is granted, is that
(the mother) would not have the standing to obtain the abortion.”107
This action shows how prenatal substance abuse prosecutions often
100. Martin, supra note 1.
101. Compl., supra note 2, at 2. The plaintiff’s legal name was not Jane Doe; however,
this was the name used in the court f ilings.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Notice of Filing Suppl. Evid., supra note 5, at 1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2. For more on fetal personhood and fetal protection laws, see, e.g., Goodwin,
supra note 6, at 790. For the perspective of supporters of fetal personhood movements,
see, e.g., Mark H. Bonner & Jennifer A. Sheriff, A Child Needs a Champion: Guardian
Ad Litem Representation for Prenatal Children, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 511, 530,
542 (2013).
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fit within the goals of fetal protection movements and aim to hinder
the exercise of a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion.
Not only does the plight of Jane Doe represent a larger prosecu-
torial attempt to restrict a woman’s right to an abortion but, Jane
Doe’s case indicates the tension between the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the prosecution of women for prenatal substance abuse
before the fetus is viable. While the trimester framework was aban-
doned by Casey, it is clear that a woman has the right to an abortion
in the first trimester of her pregnancy as the fetus is not viable be-
fore that time period.108 Since the decision of whether to continue the
pregnancy is within the ambit of the pregnant woman, to prosecute
a woman for prenatal substance abuse in the first trimester, when
she could indeed abort the fetus, is premature. Second, to prosecute
someone for prospective harms to a fetus in the first trimester is in-
compatible with Supreme Court jurisprudence on women’s autonomy.
Women should not be prosecuted for prospective harms to a fetus
that they could legally abort.
While the proceeding in Jane Doe v. Rick Singleton ended after
Jane Doe filed an affidavit stating that she decided that she no
longer wanted an abortion and “intend[ed] to carry the unborn child
to full term and birth,” one could imagine a less litigious defendant
whose exercise of her abortion right could be seriously curtailed by law
enforcement action similar to that in Jane Doe v. Rick Singleton.109
A less litigious defendant with a non-viable fetus, for example, could
be overwhelmed by the legal process surrounding her arrest or rep-
resented by a less zealous attorney who is uninterested in suing in
federal court; this defendant’s exercise of her constitutional right
could be abrogated by a chemical endangerment prosecution and
law enforcement’s active opposition to her attempts to obtain an
abortion. Thus, chemical endangerment statutes can serve as undue
burdens on women’s abortion rights when they are initiated before
a fetus is viable.110
108. See supra Part III.A.
109. Affidavit of [Name Omitted] at 1, Doe v. Singleton, No. 3:15-cv-01215 (N.D. Al.
July 29, 2015). Because Jane Doe was not identif ied in court documents nor was the
docket number of her then pending state case, it is not possible to conclusively connect
her to a specif ic prosecution. Litigation in this case ended after a federal judge held a
hearing in response to Jane Doe’s f iling of an Affidavit on July 29, 2015, which stated
that “[a]fter much consideration and counsel, I, [name omitted in court records] have
decided that I no longer desire to pursue an abortion procedure and intend to carry the
unborn child to full term and birth.” Id. at 1; see also Steve Doyle, Jailed Alabama
Woman Drops Abortion Lawsuit, Says She Wants to be a Mother, AL.COM (July 29, 2015,
5:53 PM), http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_inmate_drops
_abortion.html [http://perma.cc/4A4PL7U3].
110. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
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D. The State of Tennessee and Viability
A discussion of the Tennessee statute allowing prenatal sub-
stance abuse prosecutions and the viability framework is very short.
This brevity stems from the limited scope of the Tennessee statute
which only allowed for a prosecution after a child is born. Thus, the
Tennessee assault statute did not punish women for not exercising
their right to abortion and was structured and applied in accordance
with Supreme Court abortion precedent.
E. The State of South Carolina and Viability
In Whitner v. South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the child abuse and neglect statute could be used to
prosecute women for prenatal substance abuse after the fetus was
viable.111 Similar to Alabama law, “[u]nder South Carolina law, a
viable fetus has historically been regarded as a person; in 1995, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the ingestion of cocaine
during the third trimester of pregnancy constitutes criminal child
neglect.”112 Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect
after her baby was “born with cocaine metabolites in its system” as
a result of Whitner’s use of crack cocaine during the last trimester
of her pregnancy.113
In addition to analyzing criminal procedural issues surrounding
Ms. Whitner’s guilty plea, the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s
analysis in Whitner focused on whether the word “child” in South
Carolina’s child abuse and neglect statute included viable fetuses.114
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the word “child” did
include viable fetuses in an analysis that emphasized several times
that Ms. Whitner’s child neglect stemmed from her consumption of
cocaine in the third trimester.115 Similarly, the Whitner decision fo-
cused on the rights of viable fetuses, unlike the sweeping Alabama
prosecutions that prosecute prenatal substance abuse whether that
abuse is pre-viability or post-viability.116 Although at least eighty
111. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 61, at 34.
112. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 n.2 (2001) (citing to Whitner v.
South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1145 (1998)).
113. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778–79 (S.C. 1997). The case proceeded to the
South Carolina Supreme Court after Whitner pled guilty but subsequently successfully
petitioned at the intermediate state appellate level for post-conviction relief for several
reasons including that her attorney failed to inform her that the criminal child neglect
statute might not apply to prenatal substance abuse.
114. Id. at 779.
115. Id. at 782.
116. See id. at 783.
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women are estimated to have been arrested for prenatal substance
abuse in South Carolina, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services in 2005 estimated that no more than ten women had been
prosecuted for prenatal substance abuse under the South Carolina
child abuse and neglect statute, and “none [of those prosecutions
have occurred] in recent years.”117
South Carolina law also permits the prosecution of women whose
fetuses are delivered stillborn as a result of the mother’s consump-
tion of an illegal substance after the fetus was viable. In 2003, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled in State v. McKnight, that
the homicide by child abuse statute applied to the delivery of a still-
born baby as a result of the mother’s cocaine use.118 In State v.
McKnight, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the directed
verdict against Ms. McKnight based on the State’s evidence that the
reason for Regina McKnight’s delivery of a stillborn, five-pound baby
girl was “intrauterine fetal demise,” as caused by Ms. McKnight’s
cocaine consumption and two other conditions.119 McKnight was sen-
tenced to twenty years in prison, with twelve of those years sus-
pended.120 Regina McKnight served eight years in prison before being
released due to “a finding of inadequate counsel and inappropriate
jury instruction, but no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”121
III. THE SCIENCE OF PREGNANCY: FETAL DEVELOPMENT,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AND ADDICTION
Moreover, reproductive rights are being attacked using statutes
that are based on questionable science. Nationally, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services reports that annually, “an
estimated 400,000-440,000 infants (10–11% of all births) are af-
fected by prenatal alcohol or illicit drug exposure.”122 A combined
examination of the constitutionality of prenatal substance abuse
117. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 61, at 34; see Chen, supra note
13 (reporting that at least 126 women were arrested for prenatal substance abuse).
118. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 175 (S.C. 2003).
119. Id. at 171 (“Dr. Proctor testif ied that the baby died one to three days prior to
delivery. Dr. Proctor determined the cause of death to be intrauterine fetal demise with
mild chorioamnionitis, funisitis and cocaine consumption. He ruled the death a homicide.
McKnight was indicted for homicide by child abuse. A f irst trial held Jan. 8–12, 2002
resulted in a mistrial. At the second trial held May 14–16, 2001, the jury returned a
guilty verdict. McKnight was sentenced to twenty years, suspended to service of twelve
years.”) (citation omitted).
120. Id.
121. See Erin D. Kampschmidt, Note, Prosecuting Women for Drug Use During Preg-
nancy: The Criminal Justice System Should Step Out and the Affordable Care Act Should
Step Up, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.Med. 487, 489 n.9 (2015).
122. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 61, at 9.
2017] CRIMINALIZING SUBSTANCE ABUSE 209
prosecutions and the scientific literature analyzing fetal develop-
ment, pregnancy, and substance abuse leads to a more informed view
of the competing interests involved with substance abuse prose-
cutions. The three main conclusions of this analysis are that (1) a
woman’s right to an abortion is strongest when substance abuse is
likely to cause the most harm to the fetus, (2) analyses focused on
the public health aspects of addiction do not comprehensively ad-
dress the issue of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions because
many pregnant drug users are not addicts, and (3) a predictable,
causal link between prenatal substance abuse and post-viability
fetal or developmental harm is often missing.
A. Fetal Development and Substance Abuse
Using illegal drugs, prescription drugs, or regulated substances
such as tobacco and alcohol can all harm a fetus or a newborn.123
That harm can manifest through physical harm, developmental dif-
ficulties, or emotional problems.124
1. First Trimester Substance Abuse
The fetus is “most susceptible to damage from . . . alcohol [and]
drugs” during the first trimester of the pregnancy.125 Most birth
defects also arise during the first trimester.126 The fetus develops
essential organs, especially the brain, during the first trimester, and
“[h]uman growth and development rates are highest during the first
trimester of pregnancy.”127
Alcohol use during pregnancy is harmful to the fetus at any
time; however, alcohol use during the first trimester of pregnancy
is especially harmful as it results in the “structural defects (i.e.,
facial changes) characteristic of [fetal alcohol syndrome] . . . .”128 In
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Pregnancy: The First Trimester, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE, http://www
.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/conditions/pregnancy_and_childbirth/first_trimester
_85,P01218 [http://perma.cc/7ULA7ZGN].
126. Pregnancy, Key Findings: How Much Do We Know About the Most Common Medi-
cines Used During Pregnancy?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 16,
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/features/key-findings-meds-pregnancy72013.html
[http://perma.cc/2ZSKA2NL].
127. Dennis O. Mook-Kanamori et al., Risk Factors and Outcomes Associated With
First-Trimester Fetal Growth Restriction, 303 J. OF AMER. MED. ASSOC. 527, 527 (2010);
see Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants: Understanding the Medical Risk, 1 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26, 27 (1991).
128. OFFICE OF ALCOHOLISM AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), https://www.oasas.ny.gov/fasd/faq.cfm [http://perma.cc/AR4D2UBM].
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the United States, a recent study showed that “[m]ost alcohol use by
pregnant women occurred during the first trimester.”129 The Ameri-
can Medical Association’s amicus brief in Ferguson v. Charleston
explained that “[f]etal alcohol syndrome is now the leading known
cause of mental retardation in the Western World, exceeding both
Down syndrome and cerebral palsy.”130 Fetal alcohol syndrome is one
of several fetal alcohol spectrum disorders.131 These fetal alcohol
spectrum disorders can also result in learning disabilities, behavioral
problems, and “problems with the heart, kidneys . . . bones or . . .
hearing.”132 The “growth and [central nervous system] disturbances”
that result from alcohol use can result regardless of the trimester in
which the mother uses alcohol.133
Similarly, the riskiest time for “detoxing” from opiate use is
during the first and third trimesters, thus, punishing women for
prenatal substance abuse during these periods discounts the risk to
the fetus of ending substance abuse during these critical times.134
Because of the risk, physicians recommend avoiding detoxification
in the first trimester, prefer detoxification in the second trimester,
and recommend that it occur “with caution” in the third trimester.135
2. Adverse Impacts of Illegal and Legal Substances on Fetuses
and Infants
Prenatal substance abuse does not automatically result in harm
to an infant: while some children born to prenatal substance abus-
ers suffer from developmental difficulties or physical health defects,
others do not.136 The words “may,” “often,” “is associated with” and
129. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 18 Percent
of Pregnant Women Drink Alcohol During Early Pregnancy (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www
.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/f iles/spot123-pregnancy-alcohol-2013/spot123-pregnancy
-alcohol-2013.pdf.
130. See Mot. for Leave to File Br. as Amicus Curiae and Br. Amicus Curiae of the
American Medical Association in Support of Neither Party at 15, Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000) (No. 99-936), 2000 WL 1506967 at 15.
131. Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASDs), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/facts.html [http://perma.cc
/ULB4TUT9].
132. Id.
133. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, supra note
129.
134. Anne Lingford-Hughes et al., BAP Updated Guidelines: Evidence-Based Guidelines
for the Pharmacological Management of Substance Abuse, Harmful Use, Addiction and Co-
morbidity: Recommendations from BAP, 26 J. OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 899, 926 (2012).
135. Id.
136. See Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 256; see also Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl
Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem That Won’t Go Away, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J.
623, 629 (1994) (indicating that some drug impaired children struggle with socialization
and overwhelming environments).
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“correlate” are often used to describe the causal aspect of relationships
between prenatal substance abuse and the health of children whose
mothers abused substances while they were in utero.137 Nationally,
marijuana is the most commonly used illegal drug and while it does
not cause withdrawal symptoms, it “may have subtle effects on long-
term neurobehavioral outcomes.”138 Other studies indicate that
marijuana has “[no] fetal growth effects” and does not result in physi-
cal abnormalities after birth.139 While methamphetamine’s use has
increased in the United States recently, currently, “[m]ethamphet-
amine use . . . does not appear to increase the frequency of congenital”
abnormalities.140 Similarly, the literature addressing the impacts of
prenatal cocaine exposure has been categorized as “inconsistent,” and
much of the science related to the impacts of cocaine use on fetal
and child development is unsettled and has changed over time.141 For
example, in spite of concerns about so-called “crack bab[ies]” and the
perceived extreme harm suffered by those children as indicated by
media coverage, a 2002 U.S. Sentencing Commission report noted
that “ ‘[t]he negative effects of prenatal cocaine exposure are signifi-
cantly less severe than previous believed’ and those negative effects
‘do not differ from the effects of prenatal exposure to other drugs,
both legal and illegal.’ ”142
As a matter of harm, “[m]any legal drugs such as nicotine and
alcohol can produce more severe [deficiencies in] brain development
than some illicit drugs such as cocaine,” yet women are not prose-
cuted for using these legal, but harmful, substances during their
pregnancies.143 For example, the medical literature indicates that
137. See, e.g., Valerie S. Knopik et. al., The Epigenetics of Maternal Cigarette Smoking
During Pregnancy and Effects on Child Development 1, 3 (2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3581096/pdf/nihms44Gh7.pdf (also available at 24.4 DEV. & PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY 1377–90 (2012)) (“Previous work has suggested that maternal cigarette smok-
ing during pregnancy is associated with increased risk for spontaneous abortion, preterm
delivery, respiratory disease, immune system diff iculties such as asthma and allergies,
and cancer later in life. Findings also suggest that there are a variety of placental com-
plications linked to prenatal exposure to cigarette smoke, including alterations to the
development and function of the placenta.”) (citations omitted).
138. See Mark L. Hudak & Rosemarie C. Tan, Neonatal Drug Withdrawal, 129 PEDI-
ATRICS 540, 540 (2012).
139. Sonia Minnes et al., Prenatal Tobacco, Marijuana, Stimulant, and Opiate Exposure:
Outcomes and Practice Implications, ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC. 57, 60–61 (2011),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3188826/pdf/ascp-06-1-57.pdf.
140. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 327 (23d ed. 2009).
141. See Gale A. Richardson et al., Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: Effects on Mother-and
Teacher-Rated Behavior Problems and Growth in School-Age Children, 33 NEUROTOXI-
COLOGY & TERATOLOGY 69, 69 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC302
6056/pdf/nihms245537.pdf.
142. See Bach, supra note 15, at 347 (2014).
143. Barbara L. Thompson et. al., Prenatal Exposure to Drugs: Effects on Brain Devel-
opment and Implications for Policy and Education, 10 NATURE REV. NEUROSCI. 303, 303
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individuals whose mothers smoked during pregnancy are at a higher
risk for “respiratory disease, immune system difficulties such as
asthma and allergies, and cancer later in life.”144 However, women
do not face criminal charges for tobacco use during pregnancy.
Causation is also unclear when drug abuse is combined with
other medical problems that can harm the fetus.145 For example,
later studies revealed that the concern for “crack babies” was mis-
placed: the studies that led to the conclusions that “[crack babies
were] emotionally disrupted [and] cognitively impaired . . . were
confounded by . . . small sample sizes, [use of multiple drugs], nu-
tritional status and other psychosocial problems.”146 Such studies
were also affected by the possibility that the cause of adverse out-
comes can be a result of not just illegal drug use, but poor maternal
health.147 Also, it is sometimes difficult to isolate the adverse out-
comes caused by specific illegal drugs as pregnant drug users are more
likely to use multiple substances that could adversely impact fetal and
newborn health.148 One commentator offers the following example:
[S]uppose an obese woman ingests cocaine during her pregnancy
and endures a miscarriage. Like substance abuse, maternal obe-
sity can increase the risk of pregnancy loss . . . If obesity caused
the miscarriage and not the substance abuse, this woman is wrong-
fully imprisoned. Should states now press charges for fetal homi-
cide arising out of obesity?149
3. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
In addition to developmental problems, newborns who were ex-
posed to harmful substances while in utero can develop neonatal
(2009); Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 254, 258 (citing to Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth,
Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A
Systematic Review, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1613, 1621–24 (2001)); see Marylou Behnke
& Vincent C. Smith, Technical Report—Prenatal Substance Abuse: Short- and Long-term
Effects on the Exposed Fetus, 131 PEDIATRICS 1009, 1012 (2013), http://pediatrics.aappub
lications.org/content/131/3/e1009.full.pdf+html (“Nicotine also has been shown to have
significant deleterious effects on brain development. . . .” ).
144. See Knopick et al., supra note 137 (citations omitted).
145. Kathryn A. Kellett, Note, Miscarriage of Justice: Prenatal Substance Abusers
Need Treatment, Not Confinement Under Chemical Endangerment Laws, 40 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 471 (2014).
146. See Thompson et. al, supra note 143, at 304 (citations omitted); see also Zuckerman
et al., supra note 127, at 31 (providing correspondence related to the impacts of the use
of multiple drugs on fetal growth).
147. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 140, at 328.
148. Joseph J. Volpe, Effect of Cocaine Use on the Fetus, 327 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 399,
400 (1992); see Richardson et. al., supra note 141, at 72 (“Frequent f irst trimester cocaine
users also used more alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, and other illicit drugs than did f irst
trimester non-cocaine users.” ).
149. Kellett, supra note 145, at 471.
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abstinence syndrome.150 Both legal and illegal harmful (or “terato-
genic”) substances such as opioids, benzodiazopenes, and cocaine
can result in neonatal abstinence syndrome.151 Prenatal alcohol use
can also result in seizures and withdrawal symptoms.152 Compara-
tively, “[p]renatal opiate exposure has greater adverse impact than
prenatal cocaine exposure on the infant [central nervous system]
and autonomic nervous system.”153
The number of children born with neonatal abstinence syndrome
has increased in recent years.154 Neonatal abstinence syndrome
manifests in newborns through symptoms such as “seizures, diffi-
culty feeding, respiratory complications . . . low birth weights,”155
“loud, high-pitched crying, sweating, . . . and gastrointestinal dis-
turbances.”156 Notably, “[t]he region including Alabama, Mississippi,
Tennessee and Kentucky has the highest rate [of neonatal absti-
nence syndrome], with 16.2 cases per 1,000 [births].”157
4. Viability
As explored supra, in Part II, the concept of viability is the key
to understanding and applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion
precedent.158 The U.S. Supreme Court explained that a fetus is
“viable” when it is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb,
albeit with artificial aid.”159 As medical advances continue, the time
at which “viability” occurs becomes earlier and earlier in the preg-
nancy. In 1973, when Roe v. Wade was decided, the point of viability
150. Anne Greenough & Zainab Kassim, Effects of substance abuse during pregnancy,
125 J. OF ROYAL SOC. FOR THE PROMOTION OF HEALTH 212, 212 (2005).
151. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, supra note 40; see Teratogens, CHILDREN’S HOSP.
OF WISCONSIN (2015), http://www.chw.org/medical-care/genetics-and-genomics-program
/medical-genetics/teratogens [http://perma.cc/MGX85VH4] (“A teratogen is an agent, which
can cause a birth defect. It is usually something in the environment that the mother may
be exposed to during her pregnancy. It could be a prescribed medication, a street drug,
alcohol use, or a disease present in the mother which could increase the chance for the
baby to be born with a birth defect.”).
152. Hudak & Tan, supra note 138, at 542.
153. Minnes et al., supra note 139, at 65.
154. Veeral N. Tolia et al., Increasing Incidence of the Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
in U.S. Neonatal ICUs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2118, 2119 (2015) (citation omitted).
155. Ashley Culver, Care for Newborns with Drug Withdrawal Uneven: Study,
VANDERBILT UNIV. (July 17, 2014, 9:12 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2014/07/care-for
-newborns-with-drug-withdrawal-uneven [http://perma.cc/HH67XQZ5].
156. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, PUBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pubmedhealth/PMHT0024264 [http://perma.cc/7FENE4TL]; see Hendrée E. Jones et.
al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome After Methadone or Buprenorphine Exposure, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2320, 2321 (2010).
157. Martin & Yurkanin, supra note 27.
158. See supra Part II; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 860 (1992).
159. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
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“usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but [could] occur
earlier, even at 24 weeks.”160 Currently, viability is usually placed at
twenty-four weeks but can occur earlier, even at twenty-two weeks.161
As emphasized in Casey, the State may restrict abortions after
the fetus has become viable, as long as there are exceptions for
pregnancies that endanger the health or life of the mother.162 Practi-
cally, not including exceptions such as those for the health or life of
the mother or rape or incest, forty-three states restrict abortions
based on viability or gestational age of the fetus.163 Some states set
those time-based restrictions at twenty weeks, which is actually before
the generally accepted “point” at which fetuses become viable.164
Alabama requires “viability testing” for any abortion after nineteen
weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion is during a medical emer-
gency.165 South Carolina permits abortions in the first and second
trimesters of pregnancy; abortions in the third trimester are permit-
ted only to “preserve the life or health of the woman.”166 Tennessee
permits abortion “[a]fter three (3) months, but before viability of the
160. See id. at 160. In 1992, the Court noted that the point at which viability occurred
had changed but that this did not affect the central holding of Roe. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“We have seen how
time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions: advances in maternal health care
allow for abortions safe to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, see
Akron I, supra, 462 U.S., at 429, n. 11 . . . and advances in neonatal care have advanced
viability to a point somewhat earlier. Compare Roe, 410 U.S., at 160 . . . with Webster,
supra, 492 U.S., at 515–516 . . . (opinion of REHNQUIST, C.J.); see Akron I, 462 U.S., at
457, and n. 5, 103 S. Ct., at 2489, and n. 5 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). But these facts
go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests, and the
divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe’s
central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abor-
tions. The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns
on whether viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe,
at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier
in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the
future. Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the
critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no change in
Roe’s factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an
argument for overruling it.” ).
161. Pam Belluck, Premature Babies May Survive at 22 Weeks if Treated, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/health/premature-babies
-22-weeks-viability-study.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/29WLHMKH] (discussing Matthew
A. Rysavy et. al, Between-Hospital Variation in Treatment and Outcomes in Extremely
Preterm Infants, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 1801 (2015)).
162. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 846.
163. See State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (2016), https://www
.guttmacher.org/print/state-policy/explore/state-policites-later-abortions [http://perma.cc/
447KT8QD] (stating that forty-three states restrict abortions based upon fetus viability).
164. See Randy Beck, Twenty-Week Abortion Statutes: Four Arguments, 43 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 187, 187 (2016).
165. See ALA. CODE § 26-22-4 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
166. See S.C. CODE § 44-41-20 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
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fetus”; abortions “during viability of the fetus” are permitted “to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother.”167
B. Addiction
Examining the scientific literature on addiction reveals that
scholarly criticisms of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions as
“criminalizing addiction” do not address the whole spectrum of pre-
natal substance abuse prosecutions as many prenatal substance
abuse defendants are not actually drug addicts. Recent scholarship
has focused on public health concerns and the thesis that prosecut-
ing women for prenatal substance abuse violates the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by prosecuting
pregnant drug addicts for a condition, rather than an act.168 How-
ever, not all prenatal substance abusers are addicts, which is a fact
that much of the addiction-based scholarship does not adequately
address.169 Much of the legal literature mentions the concept of “ad-
diction” without defining the term or distinguishing between drug
addicts and drug users. Medically, the word “addiction” is
[a] term used to indicate the most severe, chronic stage of
substance-use disorder, in which there is a substantial loss of
167. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
168. Smith & Dabiri, supra note 8, at 59 (identifying various constitutional issues that
arise with prenatal substance abuse prosecutions: “ ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in
violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution . . . whether the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated by the lack of notice to the
defendants that their conduct is criminal . . . whether the due process clause is violated
absent a showing by the state that the legislature had intended to make criminal the
conduct of the drug-addicted mother who passes on controlled substances to a fetus or
a newborn child . . . the use of admissions made by a defendant to her doctor and her
children’s doctor in her conviction . . . the due process issue of the quantum of proof
necessary to convict a person for allegedly passing cocaine through the umbilical cord to
a newborn child . . . the discriminatory impact of criminal prosecution since the majority
of the defendants in these cases are black women.” (footnotes omitted)).
169. See Nora Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of
Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, 367 (2016) (stating that only a minority of drug users
become addicts); see also Lynn M. Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women
Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461, 475–76 (2005) (“Some
women who use drugs during pregnancy are not addicted and may, like some people who
drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes, use drugs only on an occasional basis. Other women,
however, may be addicted. As the United States Supreme Court and the health com-
munity have long recognized, drug addiction is an illness that generally cannot be overcome
without treatment. The American Medical Association has unequivocally stated: ‘. . . it
is clear that addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower.
Instead, dependency is the product of complex hereditary and environmental factors. It
is properly viewed as a disease, and one that physicians can help many individuals con-
trol and overcome.’ ” ). See, e.g., Martin, supra note 34 (telling the story of Casey Shehi
who was charged with chemical endangerment of a child after taking half of a valium
tablet in the last trimester of her pregnancy).
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self-control, as indicated by compulsive drug taking despite the
desire to stop taking the drug. In the DSM-5 [Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition], the term
addiction is synonymous with the classification of severe sub-
stance-use disorder.170
Only a “minority” of drug users become drug addicts, “just as not
everyone is equally at risk for the development of other chronic
diseases.”171 While the distinction between the “chronic” nature of
drug addiction and “acute” uses of drugs was noted by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Robinson v. California, the distinction between a
chronic condition and an acute one is often overlooked by the litera-
ture.172 Thus, by focusing only on addiction, only a small subset of
prosecutions, regardless of the viability of the fetus, would be uncon-
stitutional. The difference between a chronic condition and an acute
use is why this Article does not focus on the criminalization of ad-
diction and instead focuses on the other scientific aspect of prenatal
substance abuse—fetal health and viability.
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the prosecution of women for prena-
tal substance abuse with two explanations. The first explanation
focused on abortion doctrine and the concept that, under Roe v. Wade
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the law in the United States is
that a woman has a right to abort her fetus before the fetus is viable.
Accordingly, prenatal substance abuse prosecutions are unconstitu-
tional when a woman is pregnant and the fetus has not reached the
point of viability, which is, according to the medical literature, around
twenty-four weeks.173 On the other hand, under an abortion doctrine
focused analysis, prenatal substance abuse prosecutions in the time
period after the fetus is viable, including after a child is born, are
not unconstitutional.
Second, this Article has used science to examine both the consti-
tutionality of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions and the public
policy concerns underlying those prenatal substance abuse prosecu-
tions. Comparing the Tennessee statute addressing prenatal sub-
stance abuse to those in Alabama and South Carolina, mothers who
wanted to pursue substance abuse treatment in Tennessee had an
170. Volkow et al., supra note 169, at 364.
171. Id. at 367.
172. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662–63 (1962) (describing the differences
between chronic and acute drug use).
173. See Beck, supra note 164, at 202.
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advantage over mothers in Alabama and South Carolina due to the
inclusion of a statutory affirmative defense of substance abuse treat-
ment to an assault charge for prenatal substance abuse.
While many articles address the possibility that prenatal sub-
stance abuse prosecutions criminalize addiction, a review of the sci-
ence of addiction reveals that that perspective is incomprehensive.
By looking at both the science of addiction and the science of fetal
harm, this Article makes four observations based on the medical
and legal literature: (1) an argument that prenatal substance abuse
criminalizes addiction does not apply to many women who use illicit
substances while pregnant as not all users of illicit substances are
addicts, (2) not all fetuses are harmed by prenatal substance abuse,
(3) legal substances like alcohol and tobacco can cause more harm
to a fetus or infant than illicit substances, and women “are almost
20 times more likely to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes than to use
cocaine during pregnancy,”174 and (4) the right to abort a fetus is the
most unfettered when the possibility of harm to the fetus is also the
greatest. Nevertheless, the rule of law in the United States is that
a woman has a right to an abortion before the fetus is viable, and
prosecutions of women for implicitly not exercising that right should
be unconstitutional before the fetus is viable.
174. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 850.

